





MONETARY POLICY WITH LIQUIDITY FRICTIONS 
  





This paper explores the welfare effects of a reduction in the inflation rates in an 
environment of incomplete markets. We built a dynamic heterogeneous agent 
model that features idiosyncratic risks in the labor supply and liquidity frictions. 
The model shows that a disinflation policy results in an income reallocation 
among debtors and lenders. The changes in the capital returns conveys variations 
in the precautionary savings and hence, an intertemporal redistribution of wealth 
and income. The welfare implications are develop according to the incomplete 
market features and the money plays a role of smoothing consumption when the 
agents faces income variability without state contingent insurance. The model is 
calibrated for the Colombian economy in such a way that disinflation episodes 
are replicated. Early results show that the disinflation monetary policy leads to 
improvements of liquidity in the economy because the money holdings are used 
by the agents for wealth transfer over time. This paper shows quantitative 
evidence in which disinflation facts are associated with increments in the average 
real money holdings and average consumption. In addition, the volatility of 
consumption is reduced as the inflation rate falls, while the volatility of money 
holdings increases (i.e. precautionary demand for money balance). 
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Este artículo analiza los efectos sobre el bienestar de una reducción de la tasa de 
inflación en un ambiente de mercados incompletos. Se construye un modelo de 
agentes heterogéneos con fricciones de liquidez y riesgos idiosincráticos en la 
oferta de trabajo. Este modelo muestra como una política desinflacionaria 
produce cambios en la distribución del ingreso entre deudores y acreedores. 
Cambios en los  retornos del capital inducen cambios en el ahorro precautelativo 
y por lo tanto un redistribución intertemporal de la riqueza y el ingreso. Las 
implicaciones de bienestar son desarrolladas acorde con las características de 
mercados incompletos y el dinero juega el papel de suavizamiento del consumo 
cuando los agentes enfrentan variabilidad del ingreso sin un esquema de 
aseguramiento estado- contingente. El modelo es calibrado para Colombia de tal 
manera que los principales episodios de desinflación son replicados. Los 
primeros resultados muestran como la política monetaria desinflacionaria 
conlleva a mejoras en la liquidez de la economía porque el dinero es usado para 
transferir riqueza a través del tiempo. En este artículo se muestra evidencia 
cuantitativa que los hechos desinflacionarios son asociados a incrementos en la 
tenencia de saldos reales y consumo promedio. Adicionalmente, la volatilidad del 
consume se reduce a medida que la inflación disminuye, mientras la volatilidad 
de los saldos reales se incrementa. (i.e. Demanda precautelativa por dinero). 
 
 
Palabras clave: política monetaria, agentes heterogéneos, distribución 
estacionaria. 
 




The central objective of this paper is to analyze the e®ect of the monetary policy in
an economy where the liquidity provision is ine±cient. Speci¯cally, this paper discuss
the quantitative implications of the monetary policy based on controlling interest rates
(Wicksellian and Taylor policies) on the income distribution and wealth. The exposition
is based on the models of Abel [1985], Aiyagari [1994], Aiyagari-Getler[1998]. A cash in
advance model with heterogenous agents is constructed, in which the money is used for
consumption and accumulation by large number of agents, who are subject to idiosyncratic
shocks. The transaction costs of trading assets is introduced as in the spirit of Aiyagari-
Getler. Therefore, the cost of trading becomes a relevant variable for explaining the
behavior of assets prices.
The theoretical structure of the model is based on the framework of Bewley [1977],
Clarida [1985], Schechtman [1976], where the agents hold liquid assets to self-insure
against the "income °uctuation problem". The liquidity assets enable the agents to
smooth their consumption. In this sense, the agents accumulate liquidity assets during
boom periods that will provide consumption in periods when the agents are unemploy-
ment.
A ¯st contribution in this way was Imorohoroglu [1992] who studies the welfare e®ects
of in°ation under imperfect insurance and ¯nds that welfare costs of in°ation measure as
the area under the empirical money demand curve is a poor measure, because it ignores the
e®ects of volatility of consumption and money holdings when the markets are incomplete.
Kocherlakota [2003] built a model with limited enforcement where the agent cannot
borrow and is subject to preferences shocks. In this model, the optimal monetary policy
is characterized by the sheding of bonds when cross-sectional variance of marginal utility
is high. The main idea is that the monetary authority can redistribute liquidity from
agents with low marginal utility with respect to agents with low endowments shocks.
Akyol [2003] constructed a general dynamic incomplete market equilibrium model with
liquid money and illiquid assets. The money is valued because of a timing friction in the
bond market. The model shows that the in°ation rate transfer resources from the agents
1with high endowments to those holding bonds. The welfare implications show that the
optimal allocation depends on the positive credit held by households.
Algan and Ragot [2004] creates a model with heterogenous agents and borrowing
constraints, in this model the welfare e®ects between two types of economies constrained
and unconstrained are begin when the policy maker follow a quantity money creation rule
like by the government collecting all revenues from the in°ation tax. They found that the
in°ation cost is smaller in incomplete market compared to a complete market.
Several papers showed the importance of re-distributive e®ects of the monetary policy,
Palivos [2004] constructed a model where agents have di®erent altruistic preferences and
the in°ation a®ects the optimal path of capital accumulation. In this model the Friedman
rule is not optimal. A similar result is obtained by Aiyagari y Williamson [1997], who
found an economy with asymmetric information where the Friedman rule is optimal,
however with incomplete markets a positive rate of in°ation is optimal.
Within the Colombian literature Partow [1995], Posada [1997], Riascos [1998], Hamman-
Restrepo [2004], Restrepo [2005] have emphasized the distortions generated by the in°a-
tion tax and calculated the impact on the allocations of resources. In all models the
money is used as medium of exchange but they ignore the relevance of asset money-asset
demand and the roll of smoothing consumption °uctuations.
The model presented in this paper is closely related to Imorohoroglu [1992], Aiyagari
and Geltler [1998] and Akyol [2003] in order to shed light about the welfare implications
of disin°ation process under liquidity frictions. The studies on liquidity e®ects are rel-
evant in order to understand the roll of the interest rate monetary policy transmission.
The excellent survey of Edmond and Weill [2005] shows how the liquidity frictions are
associated to timing in the asset market. In this paper the impact of the money supply
policy on the interest rate is analyzed and explain the implications in the short and long
run.
The main contribution of this paper is to extend the previous results in such way that
they include active interest rate policy. In this paper, two schemes of monetary policy are
compared: monetary supply rules and in°ation targeting, and the e®ects on the welfare
in both scenarios are addressed. A model with heterogeneous agents where the demand
2of money depend on the state on the economy is proposed. According to that, a timing
friction is introduced when the agents exchange assets between them. The model tries to
replicate the volatility of the short and real nominal interest rate and compare the welfare
e®ects behind two regimes of the monetary policy.
Preliminary results showed that the disin°ation monetary policy leads to improve the
liquidity in the economy because money holdings are used by agents to transfer wealth
over time. This paper shows quantitative evidence that disin°ationary process are ac-
companied by increments in the average real money holdings and average consumption.
In the same manner, the volatility of consumption is reduced as the in°ation rate falls,
while the volatility of money holdings increases. That is, accordance with the intuition
under precautelative demand for money balance [see Dreze and Modogliani 1972].
The structure of the paper is as follow: The stylized facts are presented in the section
II. In section III the structure of the model is presented. In section IV the stationary
equilibrium and distribution is characterized. The calibration and parametrization are
explained in the section V. In section VI the results are presented. Some concluding
remarks are the given in Section VII.
2 Stylized Facts
In any case, the monetary policy is associated with the quantity of liquidity in the econ-
omy. The main policy instrument for liquidity is called "Colombian Central Bank Inter-
vention Rates", which are the expansion and contraction rates. According to the Colom-
bian data, the periods where the in°ation targeting was implemented, the gap between
expansion and contraction rates was reduced to 12% in one decade. Nevertheless, the
di®erence between loan and saving rates increases to higher levels, around 10% between
1998 and 2005, which re°ects a rise in the intermediation cost of the ¯nancial sector. The
intermediation cost in Colombia is on an average, more than two times that of the cost
in the developed countries (which is around 4%).
These facts are associated to the accumulation process as savings decisions are altered
in presence of liquidity constraints Zeldes [1994]. According to the Colombian facts, using
3Figure 1: Policy Rates
the Quality of Life Survey for 2003, the households with low and middle income own the
10% and 18% of holdings assets, while households with high income own the 63%. With
respect to ¯nancial assets, the General Media Survey for 2000 showed that the main
¯nancial holdings by households with low income are saving accounts and debit cards
(32% and 20% respectively). As for households with middle income, the savings accounts
and debit card are the main ¯nancial holdings but the share of credit as ¯nancial holdings
increased 22%. In the case of households with high income, the composition of ¯nancial
assets is similar to middle income group.
3 Model
3.1 The individual's problem
Following the model proposed by Aiyagari and Geltler [1998], we built a cash-in- advance
model with idiosyncratic risks and transaction costs. The economy is composed by a
4Figure 2: Financial Cost: International Comparison
collection of agents (I), which are endowed with private bond claims (bi), inelastic labor
units which are normalized to 1, and money (Mi). The labor income is random, non-
correlated across the individuals and obey the Markov stochastic process at follow:
F("t+1;") = prob["t+1 = "
0j"t = "]
Where " 2 f"e;"ug, denotes the probability of remaining employment or unemployment
depending on the last state.
Since the individual labor market is risky, individuals would like to purchase a se-
curities against the possibility of receiving a drop in income. We assume that this in-
surance does not exist and therefore the labor market is incomplete. The assets hold-
ings are subject to di®erent realizations of a stochastic variable, that is grid as Z =
[0 < b1 < b2 <;:: < bn]. In this sense, the consumption plans are a result of the intertem-
poral trade between agents. The intermediation of assets is costless in the money market
and individuals can hold money accounts. The money enters as a medium of exchange
via cash-in-advance constraint, which is used to purchase consumption goods and nominal
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Where ci;Mi;bi; are the individual consumption, money and assets holdings respec-
tively. The wi;p;r are the prices of labor, consumption goods, and the rental price of
capital. The last one is free-risk. (T) denotes the nominal transfers that each individ-
ual receives. Á is the transaction cost when the agents buy or sell assets. µ is a debt
limit that guarantees that (ci
t ¸ 0). Note that both frictions introduced (The borrowing
constraint and the transactions cost) depend on the di®erent accrual of labor income. If
the individual receives high income, he would like to lend to another individual with low
income. In addition, if an individual desires to borrow or lend there is a liquidity cost
which is proportional to the size of trade. Wherever individuals use money for exchange
1Posible extension of this model is consider a Sidaruki representation which is well exposed in Heer
[2004] and Algan and Ragot [2006]. The Sidraski model with heterogenous agents is debt contraint. The
model present here considers frictions as well debt limits and prices and therefore the Sidrauski model is
not analyzed in this paper.
6or if the liquidity constraint is active, depending on the nature state. As a matter of fact,
if agents desire to buy assets, the cash-in advance constraint can be expressed:
c
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If agents desire to sell assets, the cash in advance is:
c
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The optimal intertemporal allocations are the portfolio composition between money, assets
or debt. The control variables are consumption and money, the state variable are the assets





































































































: ¯ f(1 + r)¸1t+1 + ¸2t+1 [(1 ¡ Á)]g = ¸1t + ¸2t [(1 + Á)] if " = u (7)
Where are the Lagrange multipliers associated to each constraint. The Euler equation
for this problem is (if the agent is buyer):
(1 + Á)uc(ct) >
¯2
¼t+2
fE fuc(ct+2)g[r ¡ Á] + E fuc(ct+1)g¯(1 + Á)(ind(e) ¡ ind(u))g
(8)
where ind(e) and ind(u) are the indicator function that take the value one if the agent
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ind(u) = 1 ¡ ind(e)
The equation 8 shows the bene¯t and cost of consuming one less unit at time t and
using the cash to increase at+1 by unit. Note that the bene¯ts are a®ected by the transac-
tion costs which alter the return of assets. On the other hand, the in°ation rate reduced
the future consumption for each individual, therefore the savings decisions are a®ected
by liquidity frictions and the in°ation level.
In order for the individuals to smooth their consumption facing a °uctuating income,
the individuals hold on to the liquidity from assets to prevent the individual form su®er-
ing consumption reduction caused by lower income realizations. Behind the incomplete
market framework, the liquidity provision is ine±cient. In this sense the monetary policy




Uc(t+1) and Ã1 =
Uc(t+2)










0;")[r ¡ Á] + ¯(1 + Á)(ind(e) ¡ ind(u))
In the steady-state the Euler condition satis¯es the following condition:
e ¼ =
¯2 (r ¡ Á)
((1 + Á)(1 ¡ ¯(ind(e) ¡ ind(u)))
If the nominal interest rate is de¯ned as rn = r ¡ ¼ the optimal level of in°ation is:
e ¼ =
¯2 (rn ¡ Á)
((1 + Á)(1 ¡ ¯(ind(e) ¡ ind(u))) + ¯2
In the model of Kehoe and Levine [2000] the restrictions are called short sales and it
is di®erence of the debt constrained market because dynamic properties in the ¯rst case
are more complicated in the stochastic environment instead of the second model. In the
model presented here, is a non-stochastic model and own properties of the equilibrium
are according with Kehoe and Levine [2000](see pag 7-8)
In this model a Taylor program is consider: The central bank responds to deviations
from target levels. For simplicity we assume that transaction cost is equal between buyer
and sellers as characterized in the optimal conditions.
















((1 + Á)(1 ¡ ¯(ind(e) ¡ ind(u))) + ¯2
The monetary policy is solution to the Euler equation described above, the monetary
policy a®ect the liquidity of the economy. The existence of a solution o®ered by of the
9di®erent monetary programs described above is characterized through the existence of the
¯x point solution for di®erent schemes. We assume that the monetary policy function is












































































To study the existence of solutions to last equation, the operator T is de¯ned in the





2 ± Then we need to ensure that the operator T
is a contraction mapping and after the Banach ¯xed point properties provides su±cient
conditions in order to prove the monetary solution.












































then T is a
contraction with modulus 1
¼¤
4 Stationary Equilibrium
Let (Â;B;Ã) be a probability space where (B) is a ¾¡suitable algebra on Â and Ã a
probability measure.













monetary policy is a value function V i(a;b;"), individual policy rules for consumption
c(a;b;"), demand for money in the next period M0(a;b;") and assets a0(a;b;") in the next
10period. Time- invariant distribution of state variable x=(a;b;"), and a vector of time
invariant prices fp;w;rg, and a vector of aggregates variables (A;b) such that:
² Given fp;w;rg the invariant prices c(a;b;");b0(a;b;");a0(a;b;") are the optimal de-


















































































































For computing the equilibrium in this type of the economies, ¯rstly it is required to
calculate the invariant transition probabilities for di®erent states of the economy (i.e
employment and unemployment). Other parameters as the impatient rate, risk aversion
and income levels are taken as exogenous according with the Colombian literature. As
described above, the individual employment state is assumed to follow a ¯rst-order Markov













According to that, the ergodic transition matrix, is de¯ned by (L = limn!1 P n), hence







The invariant transition matrix in order to depict the employment in each state it is
necessary to calculate the policy function. This data is according to duration of unem-
ployment of 40 weeks and rate of employment equivalent to the ratio between occupied to
PET which is 0.53, therefore N= 0.53. In this sense, we need to characterize the invari-
ant wealth and income distribution and apply the algorithm suggested by Imorohoroglu
[1989]:
² Step 1: Speci¯cation of state-space. In this case the state variables are the quantity
of money and assets in the future, the employment status. A grid on the Assets and
Money spaces is used for calculation of policy rules.
² Step 2: The computation of the value function and decision rules for holding assets
or money using the ergodic Markov chain. The methodology is based on the iteration
of value function until convergence to invariant joint distribution.
12² Step3: With the distribution of consumption, assets and money holdings is estimed
with invariant distribution.








;° = 4;¯ = 0:96
The average working time is according to average quantity of labor, that is 0.33. The
monetary aggregated used is M1 which is di®erent form other papers for Colombia as in
Carrasquilla [1994] and Posada [1995]. Velocity of Money M1 equal to average during
1950-2004, PY/M = 3.86 used the Colombian data provide by Banco de la Republica
de Colombia statistics. The assets holdings are equal to aggregate capital stock in the
economy used the historical data of DNP. The ratio M/P is based on the historical series
of Banco de la Republica of Colombia.
K M/P N
2.4 0.12 0.53
6 Computational Experiments and Results
The computable model, replicates the main episodes of the in°ation in Colombian econ-
omy. Behind in°ation target scheme. Two periods are highlighted, the ¯rst called mod-
erated in°ation period (1994-1998) which was characterized by gap between contraction
and expansion rate on an 22% average. The second period, between (1999-2004),depicts
contraction rates which were reduced in 20 percentage points.
According to that, we distinguished two types of the liquidity constraints in the two
periods described above. In the ¯rst period, there was a high intermediation cost which
amounts to around 12% and which was spread between loan and deposits rates. In
addition, this spread variability lead to reduction in the intertemporal credit °ows. In
this sense, the welfare e®ects of in°ation targeting policy was a®ected by the variability
13in the consumption and income. The results are presented as percentage change with
respect to benchmark values (see the next table).
Table 1
¼ = 0:25 ¼ = 0:20 ¼ = 0:15
Average Real Money Holding 0.162 0.206 0.275
Std Dev of Real Money Holding 0.055 0.071 0.095
Average Consumption 0.015 0.278 0.956
Std Dev of Consumption 0.159 0.149 0.134
Average Income 0.052 0.081 0.087
Std Dev of Income 0.159 0.149 0.134
Average Utility -0.098 -0.083 -0.072
Bonds Holdings 0.091 0.124 0.175
It can be observed that a period with high in°ation is associated with high variability
in the consumption and income. Additionally, average money holdings are lower in the
economies with high in°ation rates, therefore, the agents reduced the cash balances in
these periods. In the graph 2,3 and 4 the stationary distribution of money holdings is
illustrated.
The intuition behind these results is that intertemporal decisions pattern rules changes
of each type of agents changed with the di®erent levels of in°ation rates. The graph 5,6,7
describes the optimal policy function for each case of in°ation rate. In accordance with
Euler conditions (equations 8 and 9), the in°ation rate alters the slope of the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution, and as illustrated in the graphs, the slope of policy function
changes for each agent. In economies with high in°ation the credit bonds and money
values drop in transferring wealth over time.
The second period was characterized by a contraction in the economic activity in 1999
which led to quantity restrictions on the holding of assets. The variability of consumption
is reduced but the variability on the real money holdings increased. This fact shows that
the precautionary demand for money soars. When the in°ation rate is reduced, the return
14of real balances is growing and the agents (depending on the state of endowment shock)
prefer liquid assets in order to smooth the consumption stream. Conversely, the roll of
private bonds for self-insurance behavior with respect to adverse shock is limited.
Table 2
¼ = 0:10 ¼ = 0:055 ¼ = 0:03
Average Real Money Holding 0.4127 1.0880 2.4141
Std Dev of Real Money Holding 0.1498 0.3813 0.4272
Average Consumption 0.9638 0.9985 1.3487
Std Dev of Consumption 0.1138 0.0652 0.0487
Average Income 1.3011 1.3565 1.4828
Std Dev of Income 0.1138 0.0658 0.0779
Average Utility -0.0558 -0.0061 0.2756
Bonds Holdings 0.241 0.387 0.451
However, under consumption-smoothing, in°ation also distorts the marginal rates of
substitution across agents as they face liquidity constraints, the marginal rates of substi-
tution are di®erent among them. At periods of contraction economy, the size of borrowing
is reduced and the bond market loses the power of transferring wealth across the time. In
this sense, the money is used for smoothing consumption and therefore the redistributive
e®ects is generated by ine±ciency in the liquidity provision in the economy. The graphs
8,9 illustrate this point. The disin°ationary process leads to the redistribution of money
holdings in the economy which implies that the liquidity risk is share by most agents. The
graphs 10-12 described as the reduction of in°ation leads to changes in the intertemporal
consumption and in as as the money transfer wealth over time.
This model could be extended easily with capital accumulation and endogenous labor
supply. In the further research will consider ¯nancial sector in the monetary channel
transmission.
157 Concluding Remarks
The e®ects of the monetary policy based in the prices and interest rules in an economy
with liquidity constraints were analyzed. For this aim, dynamic computable heterogenous
agents were constructed. In this model the money is not super-neutral, hence the money
has direct e®ects on the allocation of resources. As the agents face incomplete markets, an
endogenous stationary assets-income distribution is generated. The e®ects on the station-
ary distribution when the agents facing two types of liquidity constraints is explored. The
¯rst is related to the gap between loan and deposit rates, which a®ects the variability of
returns of assets. This friction characterized the behavior of monetary variables between
1994-1998. The second is the quantity constraints which lead to reduction in the quantity
of resources available to savings and intertemporal consumption.
The results show that the disin°ation periods in Colombia between 1994-2003 are
associated with increments in the average real money holdings and average consumption.
The volatility of consumption is reduced as the in°ation rate falls, while the volatility of
money holdings increases: This shows the importance of the precautionary demand for
money balance in the smoothing consumption over time.
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9 Graph Appendix
17Figure 3: Stationary Distribution of Money Holdings





















18Figure 4: Stationary Distribution of Money Holdings





















19Figure 5: Stationary Distribution of Money Holdings





















20Figure 6: Policy Function with Di®erent Employment States








Policy Function for Real Money Holding: Economy with p = 0.25


























21Figure 7: Policy Function with Di®erent Employment States











 ¬ Policy Function while employed
 ¬ Policy Function while unemployed
 ¬ 45° line
Policy Function for Real Money Holding: Economy with p = 0.20


























22Figure 8: Policy Function with Di®erent Employment States











 ¬ Policy Function while employed
 ¬ Policy Function while unemployed
 ¬ 45° line
Policy Function for Real Money Holding: Economy with p = 0.15


























23Figure 9: Stationary Distribution of Money Holdings





















24Figure 10: Stationary Distribution of Money Holdings























25Figure 11: Policy Function with Di®erent Employment States








Policy Function for Real Money Holding: Economy with p = 0.08


























26Figure 12: Policy Function with Di®erent Employment States











 ¬ Policy Function while employed
 ¬ Policy Function while unemployed
 ¬ 45° line
Policy Function for Real Money Holding: Economy with p = 0.055


























27Figure 13: Policy Function with Di®erent Employment States











 ¬ Policy Function while employed
 ¬ Policy Function while unemployed
 ¬ 45° line
Policy Function for Real Money Holding: Economy with p = 0.03
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